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APPENDIX
TRANSCRIPT OF VIDEO LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUBLIC
CHAPTER No. 4981
HOUSE BILL 1358
April 12, 2011: House Judiciary Subcommittee
Rep. Vance Dennis (R-Savannah, District 71): Thank you,
Mr. Chairman. This is a bill that corrects a problem that has
arisen as a result of a court proceeding in regards to
motions for summary judgment and the standard for
determining those. I have an amendment that corrects some
of the language to basically revert back to the existing
standard prior to that court decision being made. And with
that I'd move passage of the bill.
Chairman (Rep. Jim Coley, R-Bartlett, District 97):
There's a motion on the bill. Second.
Rep. Dennis: And I would also move passage of the
amendment 557077.
Chairman: There's a motion and a second. Representative
Dennis, you're recognized on the amendment.
Rep. Dennis: Without any questions, I'll just renew my
motion on the amendment.
Chairman: Representative Sontany?
Rep. Janis Baird Sontany (D-Nashville, District 53):
Could you explain this just a little bit?
Rep. Dennis: Sure, the court--briefly, I'm not an expert on
it but I'll do the best I can. We could go out of session here
if an expert--but basically, the gist of it is, I think last year
or the year before, the Supreme Court made a decision that
changed the way they'd historically applied- the standard
they'd historically applied to summary judgment decisions.
And they did it in such a way that it makes it almost
impossible for the court to award summary judgment. They
potentially shifted the burden of proof to the plaintiff that's
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almost--it's basically created almost an impossible standard
to achieve summary judgment. So the intent of the bill is
to--so that if there is no genuine, no real disputed issue of
fact, and it's just a matter of law to enable the court to go
back to making that decision in granting a summary
judgment motion. And it shifts the standard from what-
the standard that the court adopted, it shifts it back to what
it was prior to that decision and what it had been in
Tennessee for the last, I don't know, twenty, thirty years,
and it mirrors the federal standard for decisions on
summary judgment.
Rep. Sontany: So tell me what summary judgment is and
we're talking about the moving party what are we talking
about there?
Rep. Dennis: Well, summary judgment-- going back to--
well, let's start at the beginning. You file a lawsuit, you've
been wronged, or for whatever reason you file a lawsuit,
alleging somebody has harmed you or somebody owes you
something. The other side files a response to that. Then you
do discovery, you share all your information. Once you've
shared all your information, if there is no real disputed
issue of fact then either side can move the court to grant
them summary judgment. Which basically means you're
filing a motion with the court saying there is no issue of
fact, everybody's stipulated that these are the relevant facts,
and once you're at that point it's a matter of law based on
those facts that the person who's claiming that they're
entitled to something is not entitled to it purely as a matter
of law. And the judge has the power at that time to make a
decision on that motion for summary judgment. But to get
to that point you've got to have everybody agreeing there
are no issues of - no disputed issues of material fact. So
once you get to that point, the judge makes a decision. And
the court shifted its standard of proof to the extent that the
person moving for summary judgment has to essentially
prove a negative in what they did. And I'd have to get
somebody that's more fluent on summary judgment
207
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practice and civil practice to explain it much better than
that. But that's generally-- when you have a motion for
summary judgment, your movant is moving the court to
give them judgment before you get to a trial because there
are no disputed issues of fact. It's purely a matter of law
that the judge has to decide under the law. It's not
something that a jury has to make a decision about which
facts are right or you're contesting those issues of fact in
order to be able to grant summary judgment.
Chairman: Representative Coley, you're recognized.
Representative Dennis, would you consider rolling this bill
to next Wednesday's calendar?
Rep. Dennis: I'll be glad to.
Chairman: Thank you. Wednesday the 2 0 'h. If there is no
objection it's rolled.
April 27, 2011: House Judiciary Subcommittee
Chairman: Representative Dennis, you're recognized on
House Bill 1358.
Rep. Dennis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. House Bill 1358
as amended will basically change the current standard for
obtaining summary judgment in response to a 2008
Supreme Court decision that fundamentally changed how
you look at the Supreme Court-summary judgment issues.
So for the purpose of bringing up the amendment, I move
passage on the bill.
Chairman: It's been moved and properly seconded. Any
questions? We have an amendment. Everybody have-it's
the drafting code. Representative Dennis.
Rep. Dennis: Mr. Chairman, the drafting code on the
amendment-there may be one or two amendments in your
packages resulting-reflecting on various revisions over
the course of the last few weeks. But the one I intend on
moving today is the last four of the drafting code, 8296,
which I hope is in your package.
Chairman: Is there a motion on the amendment?
208
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Rep. Dennis: I move the amendment.
Chairman: Seconded. All those in favor of amendment
number one, say aye. Those opposed. The ayes have it.
Rep. Karen Camper (D-Memphis, District 87):
[Inaudible]
Chairman: I'm sorry. I apologize.
Rep. Camper: [Inaudible]
Chairman: You don't have one?
Rep. Camper: [Inaudible]
Chairman: We are. You want to talk-we are.
Rep. Camper: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was hoping
that he was going to give us an explanation of the
amendment before we took it to a vote.
Chairman: Okay. All right. Well, that's fine. I
withdraw-I made the second, and withdraw the motion
and so we're back on the bill unamended. So go ahead and
ask your question.
Rep. Camper: Well, you moved and seconded to bring
it-the actual motion and second so that we could discuss
it. So that's the posture I thought we were in before you
were going to a vote. So I want us to be in a posture of
discussing so that he can tell us what this--thank you , Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman: I understand, so we are-we're on the
amendment. Okay. And the motion's been made and
properly seconded. All right. Okay. All right. Discussion.
Representative Camper.
Rep. Camper: I hope he's going to tell me what this do.
[Laughter from Chairman and others]. Because the
amendment is so different than what I was looking at, so I
had a great expectation that he was going to outline for us
what all of these "whereases" meant so we can know what
we're about to vote on.
Chairman: By the way, your comment is going to be one
of the comments that we have on the Best of the 107
209
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General Assembly CD, which will be available in August
this year. Representative Dennis, you're recognized.
Rep. Dennis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The substance of
the bill is pretty similar on both sides. The "whereases," as
you refer to them, are kind of the explanations of what has
happened in our courts giving rise to the need for this
change. Basically, it just addresses, if you want to follow
along with the amendment, that there's a particular
Tennessee Supreme Court case called Hannan versus Alltel
Publishing where the court kind of changed how they look
at and apply Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
dealing with summary judgments and made a really, at least
in my opinion, made a wrong-- an incorrect decision. They
made it--they established a standard that makes it almost
impossible for a court to grant summary judgment because
it requires the nonmoving party-- or the moving party to
essentially prove a negative. So basically, the intent of this
bill and the language in this bill as far as what it actually
does in establishing the review on a motion for summary
judgment simply states that the person--a party who moves
for summary judgment who does not bear the burden of
proof at trial shall prevail in their motion for summary
judgment if it either: submits affirmative evidence that
negates an essential element of the non-moving party's
claim or demonstrates to the court that the nonmoving
party's evidence is insufficient to establish an essential
element of the nonmoving party's claim. So that's-
basically it goes back to what the standard was in
Tennessee for several years prior to 2008 when the
Supreme Court changed that.
Chairman: Representative Camper, you're recognized
whether I've got the microphone or not.
Rep. Camper: Thank you, sir. And so what you said was
that in the Supreme Court decision they made a change of
something. So what was this change that you're talking
about and was it outside of the--you have here Rule 56 of
210
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Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. What is it that was
different about what they did that got us to here?
Chairman: Representative Dennis, you're recognized.
Rep. Dennis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Basically, and
I'm--this is not an area that I'm completely an expert. We
have, I think, a more skilled guest with us that might can
explain it a little better than I can but I can tell you
basically and if you want further explanation, certainly we
can go out of session to do that. Basically, they changed the
standard to make it-- they put an additional burden on the
party who moves for summary judgment. Who's moving to
show the court that their--that the case should stop here and
not go to jury because the person who's on the other side is
not entitled to the relief that they're requesting. Basically
requiring--this would go back to the standard that was in
place for a number of years before, under the Byrd case
essentially, which is a several-year-old Tennessee case.
This would codify the standard under the Byrd case and
effectively reverse the standard that the Supreme Court put
in place under the Hannan case. And if that doesn't explain
it any better I'll be glad to go out of session to let
somebody explain it that's a little better than I.
Rep. Camper: I think that would be good, if it's possible.
Chairman: If there is no objection we will stand in recess.
Who is it that needs to speak?
Rep. Dennis: I know we have a, there's an individual here
who can clarify a little better. Certainly if you wouldn't
mind coming up and introducing yourself.
Benjamin Sanders (Farm Bureau Insurance): Thank you
Representative. I'm Benjamin Sanders with Farm Bureau
Insurance. Representative Camper, this bill is not our bill
but I think we've adopted it because it's just such a good
idea in our opinion. So let me explain my understanding of
what Representative Dennis' bill does. Summary judgment
is a judicial tool that determines whether a case should go
to trial or not. In other words, if Representative Dennis sues
me then I can challenge under our old standard of summary
211
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judgment, I can move for summary judgment and challenge
the sufficiency of evidence. And essentially saying if you
don't have enough evidence to go to trial we need to stop it
right here. Under the old standard, the court could grant
that. They could say, if he doesn't prove evidence now
we're not going to the time and expense of going to trial.
Under the standard that they adopted in 2008, they changed
that. Instead of granting summary judgment by me
challenging his evidence, they put the burden on the
defendant and said that I-- that we now have to prove that
he can't prove his case. So, in other words, if I move for
summary judgment now, under the new standard, all
Representative Dennis has to say is, I'll prove it at trial and
doesn't have to show at that point that he has any evidence.
So what we are seeing is a lot of cases that have no dispute
of facts that are going to trial that probably shouldn't go to
trial. Does that help explain it?
Rep. Camper: It does to some degree but I'm trying to
see--if this practice has been successfully working, you're
saying that in this one case--I guess we've adopted this and
it has been working for, how long?
Mr. Sanders: The-Rule 56 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure is what governs summary judgment. And that's
been in place, I don't know when exactly it was rewritten,
I'm going to say twenty or thirty years ago, and it was
adopted to also be in line with the federal rule and the
reason for that is to make sure that you can't pick and
choose what jurisdictions you file in to go to the most
favorable court. The rule hasn't changed. But in 2008, the
Supreme Court changed their interpretation of that rule.
Rep. Camper: Which, that's what Supreme Courts kind of
do in a way, they interpret the rule and apply it based on the
evidence presented before them.
Mr. Sanders: That's correct. And when they made the
ruling on that case, all the lower courts had to follow their
new standard that they adopted.
212
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Rep. Camper: So what that would say to me, then, is that
there was something about that case that the rule allowed
them reasonable leeway to adopt--
Mr. Sanders: That's correct.
Rep. Camper: So I see the rule as being flexible in that
way so now we're going to do what, say they can't do that,
is that what this is going to say, that they could not have
made that determination based on the rule that they were
looking at, at that moment in time?
Mr. Sanders: I think, what I'm hearing, Representative, is
that you're correct in that the court had the leeway to make
that interpretation in 2008. I think what this bill says is that
it is public policy that summary judgment should be able to
be granted if you can't prove your case.
Rep. Camper: What? I'm sorry.
Mr. Sanders: I think--I think you're correct in that the
Supreme Court certainly had the authority to make a
different interpretation of that rule. What this bill says is
that it's the public policy of Tennessee that if you don't
have enough evidence to go to trial for your case that you
shouldn't move past the summary judgment stage.
Rep. Camper: Oooh, I think that's tying the hands of the
Supreme--Thank you. I appreciate that.
Chairman: Any other discussion? Representative
Sontany, you're recognized, ma'am.
Rep. Sontany: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe that
we have someone else here that would like to speak on that
issue as well, so if we can continue in recess and hear from
Mr. Janney.
Chairman: Just approach the podium and just tell us who
you are for the record, please. Go ahead, sir.
Doug Janney (President of the Tennessee Employment
Lawyers Association): Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and
members of the committee. I'm Doug Janney, President of
the Tennessee Employment Lawyers Association. Actually
here to speak on another bill this afternoon but I wanted to
address some of the points on this summary judgment bill.
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This proposed bill actually goes farther than the Byrd case
which was the case that governed summary judgment
motions in Tennessee before Hannan versus Alltel, and it
goes farther than the standard in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56. And the way that it goes farther is by giving
the defendant the opportunity to prevail on a motion for
summary judgment without ever giving the plaintiff the
opportunity to respond in some circumstances. It says that
the moving party shall prevail on its motion if it submits
affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of
the nonmoving party's claim or demonstrates that the
nonmoving party's evidence is insufficient. If it submits an
affidavit saying, well, the nonmoving party's evidence is
insufficient to the court's satisfaction, then the nonmoving
party may not get any opportunity to respond and have the
lawsuit dismissed. And that's inconsistent with summary
judgment practice in federal courts and in state courts and
the way it's always been done. You have to give the
nonmoving party an opportunity to respond. Additionally,
this amendment says it applies only to defendants and not
to plaintiffs. And from our perspective, it doesn't happen
very often in personal injury cases, but in employment
cases sometimes the plaintiff files a motion for summary
judgment even though the plaintiff bears the burden of
proof at trial. This amendment carves out plaintiffs and
says that if you file a motion for summary judgment,
plaintiff, we're not treating you the same way; because you
bear the burden of proof at trial, you still have to go submit
additional evidence. But, so, this amendment is treating
defendants and plaintiffs different. That's what that
language that says "if they bear the burden proof at trial"--it
should be at the very least, it should be the same standard
under Rule 56 for both plaintiffs and defendants. Rule 56 in
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and rule 56 in the state
Rules of Civil Procedure don't make any distinction
between a plaintiff and a defendant; it doesn't say anything
about whether you bear the burden of proof at trial. It only
214
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says you have to create a genuine issue of material fact.
And that's the issue here. It was stated earlier that the
plaintiff can throw up his hands up and say, I'll prove it at
trial. That's not correct. The plaintiff still bears the burden
of producing evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of
material fact to the trial court's satisfaction. They can't just
bring a frivolous lawsuit and say I'll prove it at trial. Under
Rule 56 they still must demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact. And so we would encourage you to go with
the text of the rule. Go with the text of Rule 56. Don't
codify this amendment. At least pass it to 2012. Thank you.
Chairman: Any questions? Yeah, Representative Dennis,
you're recognized.
Rep. Dennis: Just briefly I guess I take exception to your
first point that the summary judgment motion could be
granted simply on--by the moving party submitting an
affidavit, as under Rule 56 as it is, the nonmoving party
certainly at the hearing on the motion for summary
judgment will certainly have the opportunity to put on
proof that the--that it is not--that the evidence is not
appropriate and that there is a genuine issue of material
fact. So the assertion that the nonmoving party is not going
to have the opportunity to present proof to the contrary at
the motion for summary judgment is not quite correct.
What am I missing when you say they are not going to be
able to present that proof?
Mr. Janney: What if the trial court gets your--you're the
defendant, you move for summary judgment, the trial court
gets your affidavit, cancels the hearing, and grants
summary judgment for you?
Rep. Dennis: I don't think that the court can do that. Can
the court do that now without hearing from the other side,
an opportunity to be heard? I don't think that's-I don't
think this bill changes the interpretation of Rule 56 and I
don't think the court would go anywhere near allowing and
approving that kind of interpretation. That's not the intent
of the bill at all. I don't think that's what it does.
215
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Mr. Janney: Well, that's--it may not be the intent but
that's the effect it could have. It may not have that effect
but under this, under this rule if you submit affirmative
evidence that negates an essential element of my claim,
then I don't have a-I don't necessarily have an
opportunity to respond. The court can cancel the hearing,
not have a hearing on it, and grant summary judgment
without giving me an opportunity to respond.
Rep. Dennis: There are other rules outside of just this
particular statute that apply to those hearings and would
allow you to have that hearing. Just because it doesn't
specifically say in this statute that you would be entitled to
have a hearing and put on proof to the contrary doesn't
mean it's not so and it's not covered in other sections of the
code or in other parts of the rules. So, to say that just
because the statute doesn't-just because this statutes says-
-doesn't specifically say that you have the right to have a
hearing on that summary judgment motion doesn't mean
it's not covered in other sections of the rules, to do that. So
I still-I disagree strongly with your assertion that the
nonmoving party wouldn't be able to put on proof. I just
don't see where you're getting that, other than just because
the statute doesn't specifically say it. My response is it
doesn't have to; it's covered by other sections of the rules
of procedure.
Mr. Janney: Well, there are local rules that say that a
party can get a hearing in some courts not in all courts. But
if you read this language in this statute a defendant can
argue that we've submitted this evidence, there's no need to
have a hearing on it. We've submitted an affidavit evidence
that negates an essential element of their claim or that their
evidence is insufficient. And, this is mainly directed at
subsection one that says "submits affirmative evidence that
negates an essential element of the nonmoving party's
claim." What if you submit affidavits and depositions and
evidence with your motion that negate an essential element
216
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of the claim? Could the trial court not in its discretion grant
the motion?
Rep. Dennis: I don't believe so because both sides are
going to have the right to have an opportunity to be heard
on that motion just like any other motion that's filed. You
file a motion, you have a hearing on that motion, the court
hears both sides and it makes a decision after that. And
that's well settled and established in law and every other
motion I've ever seen unless there's specific authority to
enter an ex parte order, only hearing one side, and I've
never had a case where we didn't have a hearing really
quick after the court entered an ex parte order. You don't
file a motion and get it granted without having a hearing
and the opportunity for both sides to present whatever
evidence they have and the reasons why. That's a
misstatement of the actual practice, not this particular
section of the code. And I really don't-- wouldn't have a
problem with putting that specific language in there if it
made you happy. But I talked to you about this a few weeks
ago and I never got any language from you that I recall to
try to fix it to put anything in there to specifically say that.
So to come into here and assert that this is going to be a
great departure from existing state and federal standards
simply because it doesn't specifically outline the rights to
that hearing that are provided for in other sections of the
law and code, is not accurate in my opinion. But I'm
certainly opened to being convinced otherwise.
Mr. Janney: Well, Rule 56--under Rule 56, the
nonmoving party should have the opportunity to respond
and maybe this amendment could insert something in there
that says in all--any time a motion for summary judgment is
filed, the nonmoving party shall have an opportunity to
respond. But the other thing that I'm concerned about is
why is this applicable only to defendants and not to
plaintiffs? What if I file a motion for summary judgment in
a family medical leave act case where you've interfered
with my rights to medical leave and fired me while I'm on
217
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medical leave instead of returning me to my job? And then
because I bear the burden of proof on that at trial, I don't
enjoy the benefits of your amendment. Why is that?
Rep. Dennis: I believe the intent is not--and that's why it
doesn't specifically say plaintiffs or defendant, the standard
should be different in my opinion as to when you're
moving for summary judgment as to the person who bears
the burden of proof. If you've got to put on proof at trial
and convince a jury that something has happened, if you
have that burden of proof, then to get to that trial you need
to be able to show that you've got some proof to do that.
You need to be able to "put up or shut up" at that summary
judgment stage, which is the federal standard, essentially.
And that is the intent of the bill. I think that is the language
of the bill. And that is what, at least in my opinion, should
be the standard.
Mr. Janney: The standard should be uniform. It should
apply to--irrespective of whether you're the plaintiff or the
defendant, whether you bear the burden of proof at trial or
whether you don't bear the burden of proof at trial, Rule 56
is the same for all parties in all courts. And this saying that
if you're moving for summary judgment and you still bear
the burden of proof at trial that you can't get summary
judgment on a case where you're entitled to it, say if you're
the plaintiff moving for summary judgment, it's just not-
it's not drafted evenhandedly for both plaintiffs and
defendants. It's only giving defendants the opportunity to
make use of this amendment. And that is not in accordance
with the spirit and intent of Rule 56 of either the federal or
the state Rules of Civil Procedure.
Rep. Dennis: Well, I guess we'll just have to agree to
disagree, I guess, because that is the only functional way
that I see that it would be able to work. You have to
distinguish between the--I mean from the practical aspect
between the entity who has the burden of proving
something to the jury and the party who has no obligation
to prove anything at all to the jury.
218
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Mr. Janney: So it applies--
Rep. Dennis: That's the difference.
Mr. Janney: In a case where a plaintiff files a motion for
summary judgment, they don't-- they can't follow your
amendment because they still bear the burden of proof at
trial. So what does that mean in those cases? How are
those motions addressed--to be addressed by the courts in
light of this amendment?
Rep. Dennis: Under the existing standard.
Mr. Janney: Well, this is codifying a different standard.
And it--we ought to just go with the text of Rule 56 rather
than trying to codify something that is not applicable to
every situation.
Rep. Dennis: The problem with going with the language
of Rule 56 is we're not attempting to change the language
of Rule 56. We are attempting to change how it's
interpreted because the Rule--the language of Rule 56 has
not changed. The court interpreted it one way under the
Byrd case and the court interpreted--changed their
interpretation significantly in 2008 under the Hannan case.
So codifying the existing rule language doesn't do anything
because if you don't get to the underlying elements of how
that rule is interpreted, then it's pointless to codify the rule
because the rule is already essentially codified in that it is
adopted as Rule 56 of the rules of court. So to do what
you're proposing and codify the language of the rule does
nothing.
Mr. Janney: Right. Yeah, I'm not suggesting codifying
anything. I don't think you should codify anything. I think
you should let the courts-let the--the section of T.C.A. 16-
3-402 says that the Tennessee Supreme Court prescribes
the Rules of Civil Procedure and the way in which motions
for summary judgment are handled. And so perhaps the 16-
3-402 ought to apply and let the courts say how pretrial
motions to dismiss lawsuits are handled.
219
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Chairman: Time out. Representative Watson, you're
recognized.
Rep. Eric Watson (R-Cleveland, District 22): Just making
a motion to go back into session, I want to make a
comment. Granted? Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman: No objection? We go back in session.
Rep. Watson: Representative Dennis, would you agree to
maybe sit down with John Day and Jimmy Bilbo between
now and the full committee and just straighten some of this
out? Maybe if we've got to write something different.
Rep. Dennis: I will be most certainly glad to do that
between now and then. I know some of my friends with the
Trial Lawyers' Association have looked at that specifically.
Mr. Day, I believe, has looked at this amendment and we
made some changes specifically after recommendations
from Mr. Day in particular, I believe. So I will be more
than glad between now and full to talk to all interested
parties.
Rep. Watson: Now, Mr. Bilbo, is that okay? Wave your
hand there. Y'all get together before next week then.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman: OK. We're back on the amendment. It's been -
-the motion's been made and is properly seconded. All in
favor of the amendment say aye. Aye. Those opposed? The
ayes have it. Those who want to be listed as "no," please
raise your hand, and we'll record you as "no." Now, we're
back on the bill as amended. Question? The question's been
called. No objection to the question? Seeing none, all in
favor of sending 1358 to the full committee say aye. Aye.
Those opposed no. Moves to the full committee. This also
will be one of the highlights on the best of the 107th
General Assembly.
***HB 1358 sent to full committee.
May 3, 2011: House Judiciary Committee
220
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Rep. Dennis: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This bill
establishes a standard procedure for establishing who has
the burden of proof in a motion of summary judgment, and
it would codify the court's previous status prior to a
Supreme Court decision in 2008 and take us back to the
way the law was on summary judgment before 2008. There
is an amendment, drafting code 8296, and I move passage
of the amendment.
Chairman (Rep. Watson): Motion second on the bill.
Motion second on the amendment. Does everyone have the
amendment? 8296. Any discussion? Representative Moore,
you're recognized sir.
Rep. Gary Moore (D-Joelton, District 50): Thank you,
Mr. Chairman. Representative Dennis, I'm looking at the
amendment which is quite substantially--does it
substantially change the original language?
Rep. Dennis: No, it doesn't. The original language is very
similar to the bill. The amendment added several
paragraphs on--talking to other folks on both sides of the
issue involved with the case, they thought it would be best
to put into the bill some of the history leading up to the
reason to help clarify what our intent was and that's the
reason for that. The actual statutory language is at the very
bottom and it's only the last one, two, three, four, five, six,
the last seven pages-- last seven lines on page one.
Rep. Moore: Thank you.
Chairman: Representative Camper.
Rep. Camper: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Representative
Dennis, if I remember last week we were in the middle of
some said discussion about this. And this dealt with the
Rule 56, right? That's what we're talking about.
Rep. Dennis: That's correct.
Rep. Camper: And based on how the Supreme Court is
interpreting that rule, is what this goes to address.
Rep. Dennis: Yes.
Rep. Camper: So would this piece of legislation then,
because this was a concern I had last week--and I know we
221
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had to leave because of the storms--going to in some way
tie the hands of the courts because right now the rule allows
them, based on the evidence presented before them, to
make a decision? So, to me, it appears now we're going to
go back and say to them, there was something wrong in
your decision making process so we're going to now do
something with that rule that would allow you to only look
at it and see it this way. Is that what this is doing?
Rep. Dennis: Well--
Rep. Camper: What are we doing? Because I think the
rule gives them some latitude to look at the evidence and
make a decision. But we want to go back and overturn it, it
appears.
Rep. Dennis: The issue is not being able to look at the
evidence and make a decision. The judge--the court still
has the power to do that. You're not changing that at all.
The only thing you're changing is who has the burden of
proof on a motion for a summary judgment. Motion for
summary judgment is when you finish your discovery
issues, everybody's shared all their information, if there is
some legal reason or some factual reason why you're not
entitled to the relief that you're asking for. Or why the
person who's filed the suit is not entitled to that, then the
defendant can file a motion for summary judgment asking
the court to dismiss the case because as a matter of law this
should never be decided by a jury because there is a clear
cut reason that this case can't be--this person can't get the
relief they're asking for. And this deals specifically with
who has the burden of proof on that motion as far as
establishing that there is no real issue in contention here
and which side has to prove what to--either that there is a
problem or there's not a problem that the jury should hear.
Rep. Camper: So in the decision that we are citing here,
who had that burden of proof and how does this change or
get at that? In the case that's in the first whereas clause.
Rep. Dennis: The Hannan versus Alltel Publishing case
was a case that the Supreme Court decided in 2008 where
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they basically reversed what they had been-what had been
the standard in Tennessee for many years and what the
federal standard was and still is. They kind of reversed that
and required the party who was moving for summary
judgment to--they shifted it from the person who was
bringing the claim to be able to show that there was a real
issue to be decided by a jury. They kind of reversed that
and said the person who's being sued has the burden of
proving to the court that there's no way that the plaintiff
can win this case. And that's not what the state standard
had been ever before and it's not what the federal standard
is at all. So the purpose of this bill is to move it back to
what the state standard was for--prior to 2008 and to what
the federal standard still is. That the moving party has to
show to the judge that there is some-there is an issue here
that a jury needs to decide, and once they show that, then
the judge has to let it go to the jury. But this is just dealing
with when there's an issue that there is no dispute, the
plaintiff has got to "put up or shut up" under this bill. Right
now the court's taken that away and that's not the prior
standard for Tennessee and that's not the federal standard
as it is now.
Rep. Camper: And how's--
Rep. Dennis: So we're codifying--
Rep. Camper: So how're they going to achieve that? I
need to see practically how they're going to achieve that
with this language you've put here at the bottom. Tell--
make me see how that's going to work. Can you? Like,
how is this going to achieve what you just said? You
perceived that there was a problem. Does this solve that
problem, and how is this solving that problem, is what I'm
trying to get at.
Rep. Dennis: The person who's being sued, if they file a
motion for summary judgment saying, judge, there's no
way the plaintiff can win this case as a matter of law or
based on all the facts that are here, there's no way that the
plaintiff can win this case. And if they can show the court
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that that's true-the case--if they allege that there's a
specific reason why they can't prove their case, then that
shifts the burden of proof to the plaintiff. The plaintiff has
got to show at that motion for summary judgment that there
actually is an issue here for the judge to be decided.
Rep. Camper: All right, I think I understand what you're
saying. Okay, also, Mr. Chairman, last week there were
some people to speak and I'm wondering are these people
still here or did they show up? Did anybody want to speak
on this and would be ok with you? Because we were in the
middle of the tornadoes and all this stuff last week, so I
don't know if they are or if they come back.
Chairman: Representative Camper, also the legal counsel
can advise you of some of that stuff, too, because we've
been told it might affect Mallard in a sense. I believe some
of your question--she can address that also if you need her
to. Is anyone here to speak? No one. Okay. Chancellor
Bryant, you can speak if you need to. Okay. Jimmy
Matlock? Representative Dennis, do you care to just roll
this down just a notch or two?
Rep. Dennis: Be glad to.
Chairman: Thank you, thank you, sir.
Rep. Dennis: I would add, Mr. Chairman, that we've
worked with the-I guess, the trial bar, the Trial Lawyers'
Association, in drafting this language. It's my
understanding they're not--they don't have any intent to
oppose this bill. Although there was an attorney here last
week who had some issues but he is not with-he was not
representing the Trial Bar Association.
Chairman: Sounds good. Without objection we'll just go
ahead and go back to item number one.
***House Judiciary Committee moves on to two other bills
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Chairman: That takes us back to item 26, HB 1355,
Representative Dennis, you're recognized, sir.
Rep. Dennis: Thank you Mr. Chairman, I think we had
already moved 26 but if we hadn't approved it, I'd renew
my motion on item 26.
Chairman: Representative Camper, you are recognized.
Rep. Camper: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was--I
actually was trying to get to legal to get that question
answered but 1920 came up and it was so important I was
trying to hear it too. So I wasn't really able to get to you
because we got into 1920. So I was trying to figure out in a
case like I am a--Karen Camper is a citizen who is trying to
file a suit against some said corporation, big corporation,
let's say AT&T, and we go before, for summary judgment,
I guess. How would this bill impact that process? So, I'm
this just regular person. I believe there's been an
employment problem, I feel like they've done something
wrong to me and I want to file a lawsuit. How is that--this
bill going to impact that?
Chairman: Counsel, item 28, House Bill 1358.
Counsel (unidentified woman): This bill would change the
standard by which the court uses to determine when the
burden would shift to the nonmoving party as it reads.
Rep. Camper: Okay. I guess the nonmoving party is, in
this case was AT&T, the company that I cited. Who--what
do you mean--I'm sorry, make me, I'm like just a citizen. I
don't get it. Tell me. You're trying to explain this to
somebody that don't understand. Thank you.
Counsel: You make a motion for summary judgment if
you don't believe that the evidence that's been presented
establishes--a movant for summary judgment would move
for summary judgment if they feel that the evidence that the
other side has presented does not establish a particular
claim, that it has not met its--the elements of a particular
claim--am I talking legal?
Rep. Camper: Well no, that's okay. So I file a said
lawsuit against this company. The company wants this
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summary judgment. Is that what you're saying? Okay, so
now that they want this summary judgment, there are rules
in place on how that works today. Is that what you're
saying?
Counsel: There are rules to govern the procedure and the
interpretation of that procedure would be affected by this
statute.
Rep. Camper: Okay, so how then is that-how-what is
that effect that this has on it?
Counsel: Currently, the Supreme Court, the Tennessee
Supreme Court, has made a declaration in the case Hannan,
and that was in 2008, and this would--
Rep. Camper: What did they say in Hannan? Because
what you're basically saying is that's going to be the law of
the land right now if nothing happens.
Counsel: In Tennessee, I'm quoting from the case-
Rep. Camper: That's fine.
Counsel: A moving party who seeks to shift the burden of
production to the nonmoving party, who bears the burden
of proof at trial, must either, one, affirmatively negate an
essential element of the nonmoving party's claim, or two,
show that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential
element of the claim at trial.
Rep. Camper: So, this bill now is going to--
Counsel: Change that standard.
Rep. Camper: Change that standard. Okay, thank you. So
what you're saying, Representative Dennis, is that with the
decision they made, that was somehow a change. Is that
what you're saying?
Rep. Dennis: Let me kind of use your hypothetical. You
work for AT&T. AT&T fired you. You think they fired you
wrongly. You sued them. They file a motion for summary
judgment that says you never worked for me-you're
alleging that-you sued the wrong person. You never
actually worked for me. You've got the wrong person sued.
The question is whose burden--who's got the burden of
proof on that summary judgment motion, who's got the
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burden of proof to prove whether or not you worked for
them to the judge in order to move that case forward.
Under the old standard, and under the federal standard, they
would have to-they would raise the allegation that, no,
you never worked-this person never worked for me, and
then you would have to prove to the judge before this goes
to a jury that, yes, you actually did. In 2008, the court
reversed that and said no the employee, just because you've
alleged they fired you wrongfully, they've got to prove--
this case is going to a jury unless they can prove
beforehand that you didn't work for them. The issue is who
has the burden of proof on that motion for summary
judgment at that proceeding after you've shared all your
information, you're there just on a motion for summary
judgment, who's got to prove that there's an actual claim
there that needs to go to the jury. You as the plaintiff or the
defendant--does the defendant have to prove a negative,
prove that you don't have a claim? It's kind of technical but
that's about as good as I can do to summarize the issue.
But the standard that we're codifying, attempting to codify
here, is the standard that we used prior to 2008 and the
standard that the federal law--if the suit's filed in federal
court, it's the standard that the federal courts use still to this
day.
Rep. Camper: And so there--I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, to
keep going on. So, okay, so then this particular case that
we're using as a basis for this decision made it from the
lowest all the way up to the Supreme Court level. And now
what we want to do is put in statute that says, we don't
need to do it that way when it went through the various
levels. So everybody got a chance in that process, each of
the court levels got a chance to make a decision and it was
appealed and it went higher and the decision was the same,
and then it was appealed and it went higher. And what
you're saying now is, hey, you got it wrong so let's--
Rep. Dennis: Yes, that's exactly it. The court got it wrong.
The court changed its standard. The court changed its
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standard that it had always applied. The court changed the
standard away from what the federal courts apply. And
we're saying yes, we do that all the time. If the court makes
a decision wrong, incorrectly, if the people think it was
done incorrectly, we change the law to rein that in unless
it's a constitutional issue which has constitutional
protections that are greater than normal. But yes, the court
adopted a standard that was too far to one side. If we codify
this, we will be bringing that standard back in line with
what it was prior to 2008 and what the federal standard is
now.
Chairman: Go ahead. Representative Stewart.
Rep. Mike Stewart (D-Nashville, District 52): Here's my
question. You know, I understand what you're saying
about policy. You know, we set the policies and courts
apply the policies. So it makes sense for us to-- if we say X,
that's the policy. My question is, though, aren't we here
just talking about a rule? I mean, Hannan versus Alltel,
what you're trying to do is reverse what the Supreme Court
said about how Rule of Civil Procedure 56 is applied,
right?
Rep. Dennis: Essentially, sort of. Who has the burden of
proof to prove that particular motion for summary
judgment in--under Rule 56 should be granted.
Rep. Stewart: Well, I guess, is this just--all your bills are
your bills but is this your own personal view? I mean, I'm
just curious what brings you to select this particular ruling
by the Supreme Court out of hundreds of rulings about the
Rules of Civil Procedure over the years to reverse this one?
Rep. Dennis: Well, I think there's a lot of concern within
the business community in particular that we've gotten to a
point where cases with no real merit are getting--are going
to juries because of this particular decision. And that's
kind of the issue that it's trying to address. It is my
personal belief that this is the appropriate standard, the
standard under the Celotex case under federal law and the
Byrd standard as it basically adopted the Celotex standard.
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It was the--is the appropriate standard that we should be
using in determining whether or not summary judgments
should be granted. But, so, it is my personal position that
this is the correct standard, but in addition I believe a great
deal of the business community, small and large, and those
who are concerned about getting rid of frivolous
complaints, frivolous lawsuits before it gets to a jury, the
time and expense of a jury trial if there is no real issue of
fact to be decided by a trier of fact. This is the appropriate
standard to use when determining that so that you avoid the
unnecessary time and expense of a full blown jury trial if
there is no real issue of fact, if there is no real issue of fact.
Rep. Stewart: Well, I guess my concern is on a rules case,
do we really want to--you know, it's different from creating
an environmental law or a law about where someone can
carry a gun. You know, those are our--that's our job, we
can make that decision, okay. But I'm worried-it seems
like this is a bad precedent because the courts ultimately
create these rules. We have a hand in it, but aren't we
really encroaching upon an independent branch of
government? You know, the reason I say that-- you think
back, you know, where Roosevelt, a very popular
President, ran into trouble with his own Democrats is when
he tried to pack the Supreme Court and the Democratic
Senate said no because they respected--even though they
had respect for the President, they respected even more this
separate branch of government. Seems to me what we're
doing here--set aside, I'm not an employment lawyer so I
don't deal with this issue--but I mean if every time the
Supreme Court says something about a rule that we don't
like, if we're going to start getting in the business of
rewriting the rules every time a case is lost, it seems like
we're stepping into-we're stepping into their house and I
think that's not-is that really, do you really think that's
smart when it comes to rules? I mean rules about how
courts work as opposed to the underlying policies that the
people have sent us up here to do, to implement.
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Rep. Dennis: If it was an issue where we were actually
rewriting a Rule of Civil Procedure or changing the
language of the rule or passing a statute that was in direct
contravention to that rule, then yes, I would have-I would
share those concerns. But I don't in this case because all
we're dealing with is who has the burden of proof, of
proving these elements. We established who has the
burden of proof to prove particular elements one way or
another in a number of cases. In criminal law, for example,
the state has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that a crime was committed. If we legislatively
establish an affirmative defense, the defendant has the
burden of proof of proving that affirmative defense to the
court by a preponderance of the evidence. We always, I
mean legislatively, we establish who has the burden of
proof to prove certain elements of any type of offense, be it
civil, be it criminal, what have you. So I don't think we're
delving too far away from that. It's specific to the
application of this Rule 56, but it's not rewriting the rule.
The court didn't change Rule 56. The language of Rule 56
has not changed at all. The court simply dealt with who
has the burden of proof in whether or not a court grants that
motion, and so that's my argument in support of that. If it
was directly in contravention to Rule 56, if Rule 56 said
this, and we passed a law that said no you're not going to
do it that way, you're going to do it a different way, then
yes, I think we would run into some constitutional issues.
However, I don't think this statute does it. If the court
disagrees, then obviously they can find the statute to be
unconstitutional as far as encroaching on their powers. If
that happens in the future then so be it. I don't think it goes
that far as to contravene an existing rule because, like I
said, the rule has not changed. Rule 56 is still the same.
Rep. Stewart: Well, I appreciate that explanation because
I think this is something we're going to revisit over time
and based on past experience I have an inkling that there's
a possibility you may get this bill out of committee whether
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or not I think it's a good idea. But I think that--I'm going
to vote against the bill just because I think that we have to
proceed with great caution when we start telling the
Supreme Court, when we start reversing their decisions
about the rules. And to me, I understand your explanation,
yes we are not literally changing the words in this rule, but,
you know, we are changing their meaning, which to me is
the same thing to a litigant. And just to explain why I'm
focused on this, you know, Rule 56 is not just any old Rule
of Civil Procedure. This is the gate that you have to get
through to get to a jury. So this is the rule that says when
you're some employee, this is what you've got, this is the
hump you've got to get over to have your right to a jury
given to you. You know, and this is not Europe. I mean,
we don't--we live in a country still where juries, our peers,
make the big decisions. We keep pushing power down. I
think you'd agree with me that this imposes a more
restrictive standard for a litigant than the Tennessee
Supreme Court has assigned and so to me I think we should
leave it to their wisdom. The Tennessee Supreme Court, I
think, is a pretty pro-business court and I think we should
leave it to the courts to decide what the rules mean. And
because of that I'm going to vote against your bill.
Chairman: Any other discussion? We're on the
amendment 8296. Any discussion on the amendment? If
not, you're voting on the amendment. All in favor of
amendment one say aye. Aye. All opposed, say no. On the
bill as amended. Representative Dennis, anything else?
Any other discussion? If not, you're voting on 1358 to go
to calendar rules. All in favor, say aye. All opposed, say
no. Let's record it with the clerk, please. Mr. Clerk.
May 20, 2011: House Session, 38h Legislative Day
Clerk: House Bill 1358 by Representative Dennis relative
to summary judgment.
Speaker: Rep. Dennis you are recognized.
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Rep. Dennis: Thank you, Madam Speaker. I move
passage of House Bill 1358 on third and final
consideration.
Speaker: Representative Dennis moves passage. Properly
seconded. Mr. Clerk, call the first amendment.
Clerk: House Judiciary Committee Amendment Number
One. Spread on the members' desks in Regular Calendar
Number Two Amendment Pack.
Speaker: Representative Watson, you're recognized.
Rep. Watson: Thank you, Madam Speaker. This
amendment rewrites the bill and overrules the holding in
Hannan versus Alltel Publishing Company regarding the
standard for summary judgment in Tennessee. Madam
Speaker, I move to adopt the House Judiciary Amendment
Number One and yield to the sponsor for any further
explanation.
Speaker: Representative Watson moves adoption of
Amendment Number One. Properly seconded. Discussion
on the amendment? All those in favor of Amendment
Number One say aye. All those opposed say no. You adopt.
Next amendment, Mr. Clerk.
Clerk: No further amendments, Madam Speaker.
Speaker: Representative Dennis, you are recognized.
Rep. Dennis: Thank you, Madam Speaker. As was
described in regards to the amendment, this bill will codify
the standard of proof for summary judgment on cases in
civil courts in Tennessee. I renew my motion.
Speaker: Representative Dennis renews his motion. Any
discussion on the bill? Is there objection to the question?
Seeing none, all those in favor of House Bill 1358 vote aye
when the bell rings. Those opposed vote no. Has every
member voted? Does any member wish to change their
vote? Take the vote, Mr. Clerk.
[H.B. 1358 passes by a vote of 85-4. The next bill, H.B.
1641, relative to claims for employment discrimination and
retaliatory discharge, is then taken up. The House Judiciary
232
27
8.1 Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy 233
Amendment Number One is adopted. The floor discussion
on the amended H.B. 1641 is transcribed below.]
Rep. Dennis: Thank you, Madam Speaker. This bill [H.B.
1641] in conjunction with the previous bill specifically
codifies the standard of proof for summary judgment in
cases involving employment discrimination and retaliation.
With that I renew my motion.
Speaker: Representative Dennis renews his motion.
Discussion on the bill? Representative Miller?
Rep. Larry Miller (D-Memphis, District 88): Thank you,
Madam Speaker. Will the sponsor yield?
Rep. Dennis: Yes.
Rep. Miller: Representative Dennis, you were speaking
pretty fast. I couldn't hear you actually. I heard
discrimination and retaliation. So what are we doing with
the bill as amended?
Rep. Dennis: The bill as amended codifies the specific
burden of proof on a motion for summary judgment in a
civil case involving employment discrimination or
retaliatory discharge. It codifies the standard of proof that
the court uses when it's applying under the Rules of Civil
Procedure Rule 56 a motion for summary judgment who
has the burden of proof in proving that a case has an
existing issue of material fact sufficient to get it to a jury to
be heard.
Rep. Miller: Okay, thank you.
Speaker: Representative Stewart.
Rep. Stewart: Thank you, Madam Speaker. Will the
sponsor yield?
Rep. Dennis: Yes, sir.
Rep. Stewart: Just to make clear, this is one of the bills
you brought-am I remembering correctly-- to essentially
reverse a decision by the Tennessee Supreme Court?
Rep. Dennis: Yes. It would. It would reverse--this bill
would reverse the 2010 decision in a case that's called
Gossett versus Tractor Supply that changed the standard of
proof in Tennessee on summary judgment in these types of
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cases away from what had been the existing law in
Tennessee for about thirty years and what is the federal
standard -what it was and still is. It takes us back to what
the federal standard is in these types of cases.
Rep. Stewart: And I don't want to take too much of the
chamber's time. But I will say I am going to vote against it
just because, as we've discussed, I don't think this body
should routinely overturn decisions by our high court
whether or not it's to the advantage of one particular group
or another just because I think separation of powers
suggests that we should be very deferential to them. And I
just thought I'd make that point. Thank you.
Speaker: Representative Hardaway.
Rep. G.A. Hardaway (D-Memphis, District 92): Thank
you, Madam Speaker. Will the sponsor yield?
Rep. Dennis: Yes, sir.
Rep. Hardaway: Would you say that the bill now is more
friendly to the plaintiff or to the defendant?
Rep. Dennis: I wouldn't say that it's more friendly to
either one. When you file a motion for summary judgment
on either side, you're asserting to the court that given all
the facts that are there, after you-after both sides have
shared all their facts, there is no issue of material fact and
the person who's on the other side is not entitled to what
they are requesting. And if the court makes that
determination, that there is no way a jury could-legally-
that a jury could allow this person to win this case, then the
court dismisses the case before it ever gets to the time and
expense of going to a jury. So I would not say it is
particularly preferential one way or the other.
Rep. Hardaway: All right. Then let me ask if-because
sometimes we seek to legislate in order to codify case law.
But in this case, we're trying to, in essence, overturn case
law.
Rep. Dennis: Yes. The court-the Tennessee Supreme
Court, in a three-to-two decision, changed the standard of
proof that had been previously applied in our state for about
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thirty years and the standard that's applied in federal court
on these types of actions, and this is changing it back to
what it was before the court took it on its own initiative to
make that change.
Rep. Hardaway: So everything that was in place before
that federal court decision--excuse me, before they, was it a
state court decision?
Rep. Dennis: State Supreme Court decision in 2010. Yes.
Rep. Hardaway: All right, so, we are postured now
exactly as we would have been before that decision.
Rep. Dennis: Yes.
Rep. Hardaway: No extras in here?
Rep. Dennis: That is the intent of the legislation is to take
us back to the standard that was applied before that case
and the standard that is applied in our federal courts.
Rep. Hardaway: All right. Thank you, sir. Thank you,
Madam Speaker.
Speaker: Representative Gilmore.
Rep. Brenda Gilmore (D-Nashville, District 54): Thank
you, Madam Speaker. Will the sponsor yield?
Rep. Dennis: Yes, Ma'am.
Rep. Gilmore: So, can you tell me the difference between
before this legislation and if this legislation passed, how it
effects?
Rep. Dennis: Sure. As the law was before, in these types
of cases, and under the federal law now, the person who's
bringing the lawsuit--the person who is suing claiming
unlawful termination of their employment or retaliation,
has the burden to show that there is an actual issue of fact
that a jury needs to decide. The Supreme Court reversed the
burden of proof last year and said that, no, the employer
has to prove a negative, has to prove to the court--in order
to avoid going to a jury trial, the employer has to prove that
the plaintiff can't possibly win their case instead of the
plaintiff having to prove that there is an actual case there.
It's kind of technical, but that's the difference and that's
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what we're going back to is the plaintiff having to show
that there is an issue of fact that a jury needs to decide.
Rep. Gilmore: So, in what year was this again?
Rep. Dennis: It was 2010. It was the Gossett versus
Tractor Supply case.
Rep. Gilmore: So, does this--does this legislation reverse
that decision that was made then?
Rep. Dennis: I would say that it better--more that it
clarifies. In a sense it reverses, but it clarifies our standard
of proof and what we're going to use in Tennessee in a
motion for summary judgment to be consistent with the
federal law and the law that we used to apply.
Rep. Gilmore: Okay, and if someone feels like they've
been discriminated on their jobs, does it now make it more
challenging for them to receive some kind of retribution?
Rep. Dennis: I wouldn't say that it's more challenging.
They are going to have to show--in order to get that case to
a jury, they're going to have to show proof to a judge by a
preponderance of the evidence that there is an actual issue
here. There is something that a jury needs to be decided. If
the court looks at the case and there is an actual dispute and
they are entitled to what they are claiming if everything
they say is proven to the judge-to the jury.
Rep. Gilmore: So the standards are being raised now?
Rep. Dennis: It's not really being raised. It's being shifted
back to what it was before 2010 and to what our federal
standard is right now.
Rep. Gilmore: Thank you.
[The previous question is called. H.B. 1641, as amended,
passes by a vote of 67-24, with 4 voting "present, not
voting."]
SENATE BiLL 1114
May 17, 2011: Senate Judiciary Committee
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Chairman (Sen. Mae Beavers, R-Mt. Juliet, District 17):
You're recognized on Senate Bill 1114.
Sen. Brian Kelsey (R-Germantown, District 31): Thank
you. That's number thirty-one in your packets, Senate Bill
1114. And this bill would return us to the federal summary
judgment standard and it would overturn the Hannan case.
It prevents a rush on the federal court for summary
judgment. The--there is an amendment to the bill, which is
drafting code 00718296, which clarifies that it applies only
to defendants who are filing for summary judgment and so
I would move adoption of amendment--well, I guess I'll
move passage of the bill first.
Sen. Mike Bell (R-Riceville, District 9): Second.
Chairman: Seconded by Senator Bell on the bill.
Sen. Kelsey: And then I'll move adoption of the
amendment as well.
Sen. Bell: Second.
Chairman: Okay, motion on the amendment. Seconded
by Senator Bell. And I believe you've already explained
what the amendment does?
Sen. Kelsey: Yes.
Chairman: Okay. Any questions on the amendment?
Senator Barnes.
Sen. Tim Barnes (D-Adams, District 22): I have a
question, and I don't know that much about this, but when
you say that it only applies to defendants, why would it not
apply equally to plaintiffs and defendants?
Sen. Kelsey: Well, because of the particulars of how you
receive summary judgment in the--let me pull up the
amendment, if you don't mind, for one second. It's--what
we're dealing with here is when a defendant files for
summary judgment and then the plaintiff comes back and
responds and then the question is what is the burden on the
defendant at that point. Can you use the "put up or shut
up" rule. And so that's why that is not an issue on the
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Sen. Barnes: Well, yeah, it seems to me that if the other
side, for example, has got a counter complaint, they may be
seeking a summary judgment in their counter complaint. It
seems to me that it would be the same rule should apply
rather than create that disparate treatment, in a way, that in
that circumstance if you got a counter complaint versus a
complaint, it doesn't seem there would be a rational basis
for that different treatment.
Sen. Kelsey: And that is a very valid point and I misspoke
when I spoke in terms of defendant and plaintiff. Actually,
now that I have the amendment pulled up in front of me, it
says--it speaks in terms of the party that has the burden--
that bears the burden of proof at trial.
Chairman: Any other questions on amendment number
one? If not, all in favor of amendment one, say aye.
Opposed? We're back on the bill as amended. Questions
on the bill? If there are no further questions, we're voting
on Senate Bill 1114 and the motion would be to calendar
committee. Madam Secretary would you call the roll?
Secretary: Senator Barnes? Senator Barnes votes no.
Senator Bell? Senator Bell votes aye. Senator Campfield?
Senator Campfield votes aye. Senator Ford? Senator
Kelsey? Senator Kelsey votes aye. Senator Marrero?
Senator Marrero votes no. Senator Overbey? Senator
Overbey votes aye. Senator Yager? Senator Yager votes
aye. Chairman Beavers?
Chairman: Aye.
Secretary: Chairman Beavers votes aye. Six ayes and two
nays.
Chairman: Senate Bill 1114 goes to calendar committee.
May 20, 2011: Senate Session, 38 h Legislative Day
Sen. Kelsey: Thank you, Mr. Speaker. .I believe we're on
House Bill 1358, and this is the bill on the burdens of
production, and with that I renew my motion to passage on
third and final consideration.
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Speaker: Senator Kelsey moves for passage on House Bill
1358. Is that seconded? Discussion on House Bill 1358.
Senator Barnes, you're recognized.
Sen. Barnes: Thank you, Mr. Speaker, members. I have
distributed to the members a letter from AARP that sets out
their opposition to not only Senate Bill 1114, which is
House Bill 1358, but also the Senate Bill 940. And it sets
forth their belief that these bills would make it all but
impossible for victims of employment discrimination or of
any other employment law violation to be able to prove
their case and get their rightful day in court. I'm concerned
about what this does with the burden of proof in summary
judgment. Summary judgment is something that is
developed in Tennessee with Tennessee body of law, the
law that's unique to Tennessee, and I think it's the wrong
direction to go to abrogate Tennessee law and try to impose
legislatively a body of law that is applied in federal courts.
And that's why I oppose this bill. Thank you.
Speaker: Further discussion on House Bill 1358. Senator
Kyle, you are recognized.
Sen. Jim Kyle (D-Memphis, District 28): Sponsor will
you yield? Is this the bill we had up earlier on summary
judgment, Senator Kelsey? If it is, then I heard that debate
but is this a different bill on summary judgment?
Speaker: Senator Kelsey.
Sen. Kelsey: This is the same bill.
Speaker: Senator Kyle.
Sen. Kyle: This is the repeal of the Supreme Court
decision of 2008, is that correct?
Speaker: Senator Kelsey.
Sen. Kelsey: That's correct.
Speaker: Senator Kyle.
Sen. Kyle: Thank you.
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Sen. Lowe Finney (D-Jackson, District 27): I just want to
ask the sponsor if he would give any more thought to
letting the Rules Commission see this?
Speaker: Senator Kelsey.
Sen. Kelsey: Mr. Speaker, I believe the Rules Commission
already had a chance to take a look at it last week. That's
what I was told earlier today and they certainly have had
chances since January, or February I should say, back when
the bill was filed and they had--I believe it literally was on
the Judiciary Calendar, I believe, six weeks in a row.
Speaker: Senator Finney.
Sen. Finney: Mr. Speaker, I have the agenda from the
Rules Committee and it wasn't on the agenda of the Rules
Commission Committee. And the way the Rules
Commission works is at the request of any lawyer, or
anybody, the Rules Commission will take something up.
And as a member of the Rules Commission I can assure
you that it will be taken up. I don't know why it wasn't,
but it's not on the agenda. I can assure you that it would at
least be dealt with one way or the other.
Speaker: Senator Kelsey.
Sen. Kelsey: Well the Tennessee Bar Association had the
ability to take it to the Rules Committee, and at least
somebody on there was aware of this particular bill and this
particular issue. But I think the bigger issue is that the rule
didn't change. It's been the rule, it's been there for a
number of years. It's the same rule that was in place before
the 2008 decision. It's the same rule that's in place after
the 2008 decision. And it will be the same rule that's in
place after the passage of this bill. So we're really not
looking to change the rule. We're simply looking to
change the law on the burdens of production and how that
is interpreted.
Speaker: Senator Finney.
Sen. Finney: This will be my last statement, Mr. Speaker,
and I apologize and I appreciate the patience. It's my
understanding that the bill is actually a broader rule than
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what the previous-- the old law was under Celotex, and that
this would actually be a broader interpretation for summary
judgment, which is why I think it would be appropriate for
the Rules Commission to look at. And I would just submit
that when we start looking at rules of the court it is not
unusual, in fact it is the standard, to allow the courts to look
at their own rules and then figure out exactly how to go
forward within that body. Rather than us do it by statute,
do it by rule, and then those rules actually come before the
Judiciary Committee, if I'm not mistaken. So you would
actually see whatever the Rules Commission promulgates.
They actually have to come before the body and I think we
pass that in January or February--like, right away. So, it's
just my preference when we start telling the courts how to
expedite dockets, how to get cases moving along, that we
let those rules--that we let those courts decide how to do it
rather than doing it by statute because it's very specialized.
And if it--indeed this statute is bigger than the old rule, then
that gives me great pause, because I'm not sure if that was
fully deliberated in the Judiciary Committee, I don't think
it's been fully deliberated here, and that's why it's
appropriate to submit things like that to the Rules
Commission.
Speaker: Senator Kyle.
Sen. Kyle: Well, I have every belief that we're going to
blindly overturn the Supreme Court decision tonight, so I
guess I need to ask a couple of questions. Senator Kelsey,
based upon your reading of your bill that you're
sponsoring, if a lawyer has been denied summary judgment
in the last three years, can they then now go back and re-
file for summary judgment based upon the change of our
law? Or do they--or is the summary judgment motion that
was denied res judicata and can't be revisited? There needs
to be some clarity on that, because I truly believe how you
apply the change of the standard for summary judgment
needs to be uniform in all thirty-one judicial districts. So, I
don't think the bill addresses it, but perhaps maybe it
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should, maybe it shouldn't, I don't know. But it is but a
rule but I'm sure, as you have indicated, that people have
lost summary judgment motions because of the standard of
the court, and now we're changing that again. The question
is, is how are we going to administer this particular change
now that we are changing the law back?
Speaker: Senator Kelsey.
Sen. Kelsey: No. It will only apply to summary judgment
motions going forward filed after July 1, 2011.
Speaker: Senator Kyle.
Sen. Kyle: Are you saying that a litigant who filed for
summary judgment on an issue and was denied cannot re-
file again after the effective date of this statute with the
new standard?
Speaker: Senator Kelsey.
Sen. Kelsey: Not on that same particular issue. Correct.
Speaker: Senator Kyle.
Sen. Kyle: Is that your interpretation or does that statute
say that?
Speaker: Senator Kelsey.
Sen. Kelsey: That's what the bill says.
Speaker: Further discussion on House Bill 1358?
[The bill passes by a vote of 19-9.]
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